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Abstract 
This paper reviews the challenges and experiences in rebuilding fiscal institutions in 
postconflict environments, based on advice from the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department to 
selected countries. The recommended strategy involved a three-step process of (i) creating a 
proper legal framework for fiscal management, (ii) establishing a central fiscal authority and a 
mechanism for co-ordinating foreign assistance, and (iii)  designing appropriate tax policies 
while simultaneously creating simple tax administration and expenditure management 
arrangements. The advice was tailored to the circumstances of postconflict countries, and in 
some cases involved transitional measures that were not first best from an efficiency standpoint. 
In a similar vein, recommendations on revenue administration and expenditure management 
focused on the most basic tasks and procedures. In providing advice, care was taken to ensure 
that these measures were consistent with the eventual transformation to a modern fiscal 
management system. 
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1 Introduction 
The proliferation of violent conflicts over the last two decades has taken a heavy toll on 
life and property. The effects of conflict have often spilled across national boundaries, 
for example through the disruption of economic activity and the influx of refugees. 
Furthermore, countries in conflict have a high tendency to relapse into subsequent 
conflicts.1 As such, the legacy of conflict—and its adverse effects for socioeconomic 
development—have been difficult for many countries to escape. 
 
One of the most destructive effects of conflicts is the damage they inflict on the social, 
economic, legal, and political organization of a society, that is, its ‘institutions’. In 
particular, conflicts affect at least five market-supporting institutions: property rights, 
regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilization, institutions for 
social insurance, and institutions for conflict management (Rodrik 1999). Recent 
empirical evidence shows a strong relationship between these market-supporting 
institutions and economic growth (North 1990; Olsen 1993; Rodrik et al. 2002; 
Acemoglu et al. 2003; Rodrik 2004). Hence, institutional reconstruction and 
development is one of the key priorities in the postconflict era. Re-establishing 
institutions can help to sustain peace by laying the groundwork for a resumption of 
economic activity. Sustained peace, in turn, can further accelerate the process of 
recovery in the aftermath of conflict. 
 
This paper focuses on a small but important set of economic institutions, namely, those 
in the fiscal area. The paper reviews the challenges and experiences in institution and 
capacity building in the fiscal area in postconflict countries. The paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on some of the key aspects of rebuilding 
economic institutions in postconflict environments. Section 3 provides an overview of 
the macroeconomic and fiscal consequences of conflict by examining changes in key 
macroeconomic variables immediately before, at the end of, and the latest year available 
in a sample of postconflict countries; Section 4 discusses experiences in Re-establishing 
fiscal management in postconflict countries and analyzes, on the basis of the advice 
provided by the IMF, key priorities for rebuilding fiscal institutions in the early 
postconflict period; and Section 5 presents a summary and conclusions.  
2  Review of the literature 
The literature on postconflict aid highlights the important role of rebuilding institutions 
to facilitate the resumption of economic development and the effective absorption and 
management of aid inflows. The pattern observed in many postconflict countries is for 
                                                 
1 Bigombe et al. (2000).   2
aid to surge immediately after the cessation of hostilities and gradually taper off 
thereafter. Collier and Hoeffler (2002a) argue that this pattern of aid flow leaves much 
to be desired, as the capacity of these countries to absorb aid is rather low in the early 
postconflict period. This is partly due to weak political and administrative capacity.2 In 
this regard, a framework for stabilization, recovery, and development should center on 
three pillars: (a)  rebuilding the state and its key institutions; (b)  jump-starting the 
economy; and (c) addressing urgent needs and reconstructing communities (Michailof 
et al. 2002; Addison 2003). An important component of this framework is restoring 
state capacity for macroeconomic management and fiscal operations. Postconflict 
countries require assistance in the areas of budget formulation, execution, and reporting, 
as well as in design and implementation of critical reforms. In the immediate aftermath 
of the crisis, there is also an urgent need to strengthen the capacity of the state to 
generate internal resources through taxation to finance the reconstruction of the 
economy and ensure delivery of essential services. Thus, an immediate priority in the 
early postconflict phase should be on rebuilding revenue administration and systems. 
 
Sound policies are also important for success in the postconflict period. For example, 
sound macroeconomic policies are helpful for securing growth and avoiding a relapse 
into conflict.3 At the same time, there is a ‘virtuous circle’ between institution building 
and the implementation of good economic policies (Addison 2003). For example, 
improvements in public expenditure management and tax administration can help 
establish fiscal discipline. This, in turn, can lead to success in achieving macroeconomic 
stabilization and growth, thereby providing a more stable and fruitful environment for 
further institution building. Strengthening institutions and economic policies reduces the 
risk of future conflicts. Without appropriate institutions and sound policies, recovery 
may not be broad-based, high levels of poverty are likely to persist, and the probability 
of a return to conflict will remain high (Ibid.).4 Establishing appropriate institutions and 
good economic policies is also necessary for attracting private investment in 
postconflict countries. Postconflict countries need strong and sustained increases in 
private investment to support broad-based economic recovery (Ibid.). Catalyzing this 
private investment requires the concomitant strengthening of institutions and the policy 
environment. 
 
 
                                                 
2 However, a recent paper by Suhrke et al. (2004) challenges these findings. 
3 Fallon et al. (2004) analyze the impact of conflict on economic development in 23 conflict-affected 
countries and conclude that in the post-1990 period, sound macroeconomic policy stance enabled a faster 
economic recovery after the conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2002b) also lend support to this finding. 
4 Collier and Hoeffler (2002b) identify three policy-dependent risks of conflict, the most powerful of 
which is dependence on natural resource rents. Their analysis indicates that the risk of conflict is highest 
when natural resource exports constitute 25-30 per cent of GDP.   3
In sum, postconflict peace and economic recovery require improvements in economic 
policies and institution building in a range of areas, spanning from merely establishing 
the rule of law to restoring capacity for policy formulation and implementation. Even 
within the area of macroeconomic management, the needs for capacity building could 
be very extensive. For example, some countries may need to introduce a new currency 
or establish new institutions, such as a central bank. The need for institution building is 
most pervasive in scope for countries that are newly formed as a result of conflicts. 
Others may need assistance with budget formulation, execution, and reporting. Still 
others may require help in strengthening statistical capacity to assist in macroeconomic 
management. The focus of this paper is on institution building in the fiscal area. 
3  Macroeconomic and fiscal settings in postconflict countries 
The challenges facing postconflict countries can be gauged by economic conditions 
confronting them in the aftermath of a conflict.5 Figures 1–7 present information on 
macroeconomic and fiscal conditions in the year before the start of the conflict, at the 
end of the conflict, and for the latest year available.6 Our sample covers 17 countries 
and conflict episodes which spanned the period 1990–2006. However, these figures 
only include countries that existed before the conflict, and thus do not cover countries or 
entities that were born out of these conflicts (e.g., Timor Leste, Kosovo). 
 
Macroeconomic imbalances—already severe at the onset of the conflict—were 
generally exacerbated by the hostilities. On average, real GDP fell significantly in these 
countries during the conflict (Figures 1 and 2). This is consistent with earlier studies on 
the economic consequences of conflict.7 Both real GDP as well as real per capita GDP 
were below their preconflict levels when the first IMF TA mission took place. Inflation, 
already at high levels before the onset of hostilities, increased further during the conflict 
                                                 
5 For a more comprehensive study of the relationship between conflict episodes and economic 
performance; see Staines (2004). The author documents how recent conflicts have become shorter but 
have more severe contractions in economic activity followed by a stronger recovery of growth. 
6 In Figures 1–7, ‘end of conflict’ refers to the year before the first IMF TA (technical assistance) mission 
on fiscal issues was fielded, except for Tajikistan where it refers to the year of the first TA mission. This 
year provides the backdrop for the macroeconomic situation against which postconflict TA was provided. 
In most cases, this is the last year of the conflict or later. However, in 4 (of the 17) countries in the 
sample, the first mission took place during the conflict. 
This analysis is based on a subset of 17 countries to the extent that data are available from the 28 
postconflict countries identified in Section 2. These 17 countries are analyzed in Section 4. They 
comprise Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, 
Tajikistan, Timor Leste, Yemen, and West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The analysis presented in this section should be interpreted with caution. The evolution of the 
macroeconomic variables over the period covered by the analysis is influenced by a host of factors other 
than the conflict. In addition, the sample size for some of the macroeconomic and fiscal variables differs. 
7 See Collier et al. (2003); Gupta et al. (2004).   4
episode (Figure 3). In part, this owed to the failure to rein in burgeoning budget deficits 
(see below). The level of international reserves (in months of total imports) was also 
lower than before the conflict (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 1  Real GDP growth in selected postconflict countries* 
(annual percentage change) 
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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database 2007; and World Bank, World Development Indicators 
database. 
Note: * Based on a sample of 13 countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Croatia, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra 
Leone, Tajikistan, and Yemen. ‘Preconflict’ refers to the year before the beginning of a conflict, except for 
Albania and Croatia where it refers to 2 years before the conflict; ‘end of conflict’ refers to the year before 
the first IMF TA mission on fiscal issues was fielded, except for Tajikistan where it refers to the year of the 
TA mission; ‘latest year’ refers to 2006 or the most recent year for which data are available. For Lebanon 
and Serbia and Montenegro, the latest year refers to 2005. 
 
Figure 2  Real GDP and GDP per capita in selected postconflict countries* 
(index, preconflict = 100) 
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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database 2007; and World Bank, World Development Indicators 
database.  
Note: * Based on a sample of 13 countries. See Figure 1 for country coverage and for definition of 
preconflict, end of conflict, and latest year.   5
Figure 3  Consumer price inflation in selected postconflict countries* 
(annual percentage change) 
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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database 2007; and World Bank, World Development Indicators 
database. 
Note: * Based on a sample of 11 countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Croatia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Yemen. See Figure 1 for 
definition of preconflict, end of conflict, and latest year. 
 
Figure 4  International reserve stock in selected postconflict countries* 
(in month of total import) 
2.7  2.5
6.6 
0
5
10
Pre-conflict  End of conflict Latest year 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database 2007. 
Note: * Based on a sample of 7 countries: Albania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Yemen. See Figure 1 for definition of preconflict, end of conflict, and latest 
year. 
 
Macroeconomic challenges were particularly severe in the fiscal area. Fiscal deficits 
(including grants) at the time of the first IMF TA mission were substantially higher than 
at the start of hostilities (Figure 5). This expansion in the deficit was due to a substantial 
slippage in the revenue effort, as government spending remained relatively stable. 
Reductions in outlays on wages and salaries were especially sharp, while military 
spending increased (Figure 6). With net foreign financing falling sharply, the bulk of the 
additional financing required by the budget was met from domestic sources (Figure 7). 
Consequently, the domestic financing requirement rose to about 9 per cent of GDP. 
   6
Figure 5  Fiscal aggregates in selected postconflict countries* 
(in per cent of GDP) 
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Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff estimates. 
Note: * Based on a sample of 9 countries: Albania, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Yemen. See Figure 1 for definition of preconflict, end 
of conflict, and latest year. 
 
Figure 6  Government spending in selected postconflict countries* 
(in per cent of GDP) 
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Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff estimates. 
Note: * Based on a sample of 7 countries: Albania, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Yemen. See Figure 1 for definition of preconflict, end of conflict, 
and latest year. 
 
 
Macroeconomic conditions in these countries have improved significantly in recent 
years. The latest available information indicates that real GDP growth averaged about 
6 per cent, with all countries in the sample registering positive growth rates. Real GDP 
was more than double its preconflict level, with real per capita GDP more than 60 per 
cent higher. There has also been a dramatic reduction in inflation and a significant 
increase in international reserves. 
   7
Figure 7  Financing of the budget in selected postconflict countries* 
(in per cent of GDP) 
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Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff estimates. 
Note: * Based on a sample of 9 countries: Albania, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Yemen. See Figure 1 for definition of preconflict, end 
of conflict, and latest year. Privatization receipts are included in domestic financing, and net foreign 
financing excludes grants. 
 
The fiscal position has also improved in recent years. Budget deficits fell significantly 
with some countries benefiting from debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI). Net external financing of the budget increased sharply, enabling 
countries to repay some of their domestic debt. Revenues rebounded and rose as a share 
of GDP, surpassing their preconflict levels. Total government spending remained 
largely unchanged but military spending declined, to less than half its preconflict level. 
As such, it appears that the peace dividend was used by countries to address fiscal 
imbalances as well as to attend to pressing social needs.8 
4  Re-establishing fiscal management and institutions in postconflict countries 
This section discusses the strategies recommended for re-establishing fiscal 
management and rebuilding fiscal institutions in postconflict countries, based on advice 
to selected countries from the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department. While the paper 
attempts to paint a broad picture of the nature of the advice, there were differences in 
recommendations across countries. This caveat is important, especially when specific 
measures are discussed. In addition, the description of advice on the design of fiscal 
institutions does not assess countries’ track record in implementing these 
recommendations, since this would go beyond the scope of the present study and 
involve a more in-depth assessment of developments in each of the countries in the 
sample. Finally, it is also important to note that establishing or rebuilding fiscal 
                                                 
8 For an examination of the impact of conflict on social indicators, see Gupta et al. (2004).   8
institutions also depends on successful implementation of reforms in other areas, 
especially with regard to the strengthening of the central bank and the central statistics 
office, and to the successful development—particularly in newly formed countries—of 
an efficient banking system capable of providing cashier and payment facilities 
throughout the country to assist in the effective delivery of government services. 
 
The analysis below suggests a general strategy for the rebuilding of fiscal institutions in 
the wake of conflict. The three-step process appears as follows: 
—  first, create a proper legal framework for fiscal policy; 
—  second, establish a central fiscal authority and a mechanism for co-ordinating 
foreign assistance; and 
—  third, implement necessary changes in revenue policies and create simple 
administrative arrangements in revenue administration and public expenditure 
management (PEM) that effectively leverage scarce human resources. 
The sequencing of the steps generally followed the pattern described above, but not 
always. For example, while establishing a fiscal authority is a necessary early step in 
countries where no such institution existed before, setting up of the authority could take 
some time. However, certain tax administration procedures may need to be promulgated 
even if the authority is not fully functional. These include, for example, procedures for 
collection and payment of taxes. On the expenditure side, procedures for government 
payments such as for salaries and purchases of goods and services need to be put in 
place urgently and may not await the setting up of a fiscal authority. In some cases, this 
had to be done before a meaningful budget was established. 
 
The relative importance and sequence of each of these steps also depended on the type 
of conflict: 
 
i)  Conflicts that led to the emergence of new countries or took place immediately 
after the creation of a new country. These countries followed closely the three-
step framework described above. 
ii)  Conflicts in pre-existing countries with widespread institutional damage and 
social disruption. These countries also followed the three-step framework but 
the sequencing was not always the same. In some cases, the first priority was 
to rebuild the basic infrastructure of the finance ministry, and only later was 
emphasis placed on creating a proper legal framework for fiscal policy. 
However, in countries where the legal framework for budget preparation and 
execution was basically sound (even if it had not been applied for many years), 
other important legal reforms were recommended (such as reforms for the 
income tax law, foreign and domestic private investment law, and customs 
service law).   9
iii)  Conflicts in pre-existing countries with a low to moderate degree of 
institutional and social disruption. In cases where the fiscal institutions 
emerged from the conflict relatively unscathed, the focus was instead on the 
third step. In one case the immediate priorities included (i) restaffing all tax 
administration offices; (ii)  lowering the VAT reporting threshold; and 
(iii) securing the co-operation of banks in accepting tax payments. In another 
case the focus was on simplifying the tax system to facilitate the transition to a 
more modernized and market-friendly tax environment. 
 
The approach to rebuilding fiscal institutions was also shaped by the role of the 
international community. In some newly formed countries, the UN was responsible for 
running government operations, which influenced the nature of advice given. In these 
countries, a special challenge was to ensure that local capacity was in place before 
responsibility was handed over to national administrators.  
 
The postconflict era sometimes provided an opportunity for bold changes. In some 
cases, there was openness to new approaches that had been previously rejected as being 
politically, legally, or administratively infeasible. Thus, while administrative capacity 
may have been depleted, in some cases the immediate postconflict period provided an 
opportunity to put in place major improvements in policies and institutions relative to 
the preconflict era. 
4.1  Create a proper legal framework for fiscal policy 
The fiscal operations in any country are generally anchored in two main legal sources: 
the constitution, and tax and budget laws. The constitution generally specifies the 
division of taxing powers between different levels of government, and between the 
executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. It also determines the nature of emergency 
powers available to the executive. Tax laws are critical to make tax policy legally 
enforceable. They define the powers of the tax administration to collect information 
about taxpayers, and the administrative actions that can be taken against individuals or 
entities that evade taxes or accumulate tax arrears. Budget and public financial 
management laws are also indispensable to ensure that the fiscal authority is vested with 
the legal authority to control and manage public spending. 
 
The creation of a consolidated package of customs and tax laws, regulations, and 
directives was often a measure of immediate importance in postconflict countries. In 
countries where preconflict legislation was not reasonably sound, a key objective was to 
simplify tax legislation and procedures for revenue collection, with a view to making 
them more transparent and easier to implement and administer. In a number of cases, 
the complexity of existing legislation made tax laws difficult to implement, especially in 
light of the limited administrative capacity prevailing in a postconflict environment. For 
example, in many cases the tax code included a wide variety of duties, tariff rates, and   10
special taxes and surcharges. The mismatch between administrative capacity and the 
complexity of the existing laws and regulations often led to inevitable efficiency losses, 
mistakes in tax assessments, and difficulties in tax collection. 
 
A number of countries viewed the reform of customs and tax laws as crucial. In one 
country the authorities initiated a comprehensive programme to reduce tax exemptions 
and combat tax evasion, including through a review of special conventions in the 
investment code. In another country a new, simplified tariff law was adopted to reduce 
the scope for smuggling and fraud. In yet another country legislation was introduced to 
radically simplify the real estate property tax.9 The nature and scope of these laws 
varied across countries. On occasion, countries adopted more formal organic laws; in 
other instances, where speedier action was needed, decrees were used to modify the 
income tax law.10 In newly created countries, the lack of a prior legal framework meant 
that substantial resources needed to be devoted to this purpose. 
 
Preparing a new budget law, and adopting a first postconflict budget—sometimes a 
transitional one covering three to four months—were also key for initiating budget 
reforms. Formulation of the first budget after the conflict was one of the important 
measures to be implemented. In most cases, the existing budget law no longer reflected 
the current institutional structure. the purpose of the new budget law was to set out clear 
and transparent budget classification structures (consistent with international standards 
and practices); provide strict guidelines for budget execution such as the prohibition of 
unbudgeted expenditures and arrears; establish a consistent framework for internal 
control and internal and external audit; and provide mechanisms for the financing of 
budget deficits. 
 
The new legislation also had to address issues related to off-budget transactions, lack of 
clear classification of budgetary spending, and the absence of well-established 
procedures for managing foreign aid. Legal reform on PEM issues was also key. In one 
country, for example, the IMF quickly fielded a mission one month following the onset 
of the government’s stabilization programme. The mission identified an urgent need for 
a strong legal framework for public expenditure management suited for a market 
economy. 
 
Re-establishing the authority of the government to collect taxes and preparing an 
adequate budget law formed an important component of the strategy to re-establish the 
rule of law. The success or failure of these tax and budget reforms themselves depended 
                                                 
9 This tax accounted for less than two per cent of total government revenue, and yet the law prescribed 
burdensome procedures for its administration. Revenue agencies had to adjust each year the taxable value 
of 1.6 million properties, based on information collected from 160 counties on sales of new buildings. 
10 Unlike organic laws, which generally require parliamentary approval, decrees are signed directly by 
the executive and can therefore be implemented quickly.   11
heavily on the capacity of the state to Re-establish order and develop a system of 
judicial sanctions to penalize those who evade them (Maravall and Przeworski 2003). 
Therefore, ensuring that key legislation was in place authorizing the tax and customs 
administrations to perform their basic duties was high on the list of priorities. In some 
countries, the revenue administrations were set up at the same time as other national 
government entities in the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Because of their 
importance in terms of securing the revenue needed to finance the government’s 
operations, authorization for their establishment could not wait until the legislative 
branch was fully operating, and was thus done by government decree. 
 
The underlying strategy was to start simple. This implied that budget and tax laws, for 
example, were made very basic and short. Over time, these were expanded. This 
allowed for greater local ownership as the details of these laws were fleshed out over 
time and as capacity improved. 
4.2  Establish a central fiscal authority and a mechanism for co-ordinating foreign 
assistance 
Strengthening the central fiscal authority, or establishing one from scratch in new 
countries, was an essential step in all cases. In effect, newly established countries 
needed to create a finance ministry. For existing countries, a finance ministry needs to 
be adequately strengthened so that it can perform a number of basic tasks essential for 
macrofiscal management. Although the precise institutional structure, powers, and 
responsibilities of newly created institutions varied across countries, based on country-
specific circumstances, they shared a number of common objectives. One important 
objective was to ensure that fiscal decisions were not taken in an ad hoc manner. A 
second objective was establishing transparency in fiscal operations. A third objective 
was to ensure a minimum level of revenue collection. A fourth objective was to ensure 
that government spending was consistent with the government’s priorities. Establishing 
a set of procedures to effectively control government spending or establish 
accountability was important for efficient service delivery and to assure donors that 
funds provided for relief and reconstruction were being used as intended. Given the 
dearth of administrative and technical capacity available within these countries, it was 
recognized that the institutions should have a simple structure.11 
 
The fiscal authority was intended to perform three basic functions. These were: 
 
i)  develop a fiscal strategy and monitor its impact on the economy; 
                                                 
11 In a related vein, in two cases where issues of fiscal federalism were particularly important, it was 
argued that fiscal decentralization would need to wait, as the necessary institutions were not yet in place 
to ensure that this decentralization would be consistent with sound macrofiscal management of general 
government operations.   12
ii)  formulate expenditure policy and execute the budget; and 
iii)  formulate tax policy and collect revenues. 
The fiscal authority normally consisted of four main operational departments: 
 
a.  A budget department with the responsibility to co-ordinate the overall expenditure 
programme and prepare fiscal projections and budget execution reports. With 
respect to budget formulation, the department issues the budget circular to 
spending agencies, indicating a budget ceiling and requesting submission of 
spending plans. These plans are then reviewed for credibility and consistency, and 
adjusted where agency submissions are incompatible with aggregate budgetary 
ceilings or policy priorities. In the area of tax policy, the budget department 
consults with its counterparts in tax administration to prepare projections for 
revenues, and assesses the impact of different tax policy changes on these 
receipts. This information, along with fiscal projections and budget execution 
reports, is then provided to the appropriate decision-making authority, so as to 
enable it to make fiscal policy decisions in an orderly and systematic fashion. 
 
b.  A treasury department responsible for controlling spending and ensuring that it is 
properly accounted for. The department performs the dual functions of providing 
spending authorization to spending agencies (based on the approved budget) and 
making sure that spending is properly recorded. It is also charged with oversight 
of the movement of collected government revenues into treasury bank accounts, 
the rationalization of government banking arrangements to promote transparent 
recording of transactions, and workable strategies for cash management. The 
department also prepares periodic expenditure reports to enable the spending 
agencies and the budget department to effectively monitor spending during the 
course of the year. 
 
c.  Separate customs and domestic tax administration departments responsible for 
implementing tax policy and collecting tax revenues. In newly created countries, 
tax policy options were constrained by administrative capacity and, in most cases, 
it was decided that tax policy and administration should be under unified 
management. Thus, these departments were also entrusted with responsibility for 
tax policy. One issue that often arose in this context was whether customs and 
domestic tax administration should be merged in order to simplify administration. 
The modest amount of resources expected from domestic taxes was cited by the 
authorities, in some cases, as an argument in favor of unifying administration. On 
the other hand, the procedures for collecting these revenues differ substantially; in 
light of this, IMF TA argued in favor of establishing separate customs and 
domestic tax administration departments, with the former entrusted with the 
responsibility for collecting trade taxes. 
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In some cases a macrofiscal unit was also recommended to help support policy 
formulation. This unit was recommended for (i) preparing a medium-term expenditure 
framework; (ii) conducting debt sustainability analysis; (iii) analyzing tax policy issues; 
and (iv) assessing structural fiscal issues such as pension reform. 
 
A mechanism was needed in many countries to facilitate co-ordination of donor funds. 
In some instances, there were no procedural arrangements for the use of foreign aid, and 
insufficient co-ordination between donor agencies and the ministry of finance. In these 
cases, there was often a disconnect between expenditure needs and budgetary outlays. 
Better co-ordination was thus seen as essential for both donors and recipient countries. 
From the perspective of the donors, information on activities of other donors in specific 
areas was useful in framing their own assistance strategies and to avoid duplication. For 
the recipients, such a mechanism provided the spending agencies with information on 
activities of donors in their area of competence, and thus helped in framing their plans 
for spending financed from domestic resources. In addition, donor-financed projects 
also gave rise to future recurrent spending requirements, which needed to be 
incorporated in future spending plans. In some countries, a separate unit was set up to 
co-ordinate with donors, often as part of the finance ministry or its equivalent 
institution. In other cases, however, a multi-donor trust fund was set up that carried out 
the co-ordination function. 
 
In some cases, the establishment and consolidation of power of the central fiscal 
authority created challenges for the difficult political equilibria reached during the 
resolution of the conflict. In two cases, issues of fiscal federalism/decentralization 
quickly acquired importance, given the strength of sub-national/regional political forces 
with strong secessionist roots. In these cases, it became important to follow a strategy 
where the decentralization necessary to keep the peace did not endanger economic 
reforms and fiscal management. 
4.3  Implement necessary changes in revenue policies and create simple 
administrative arrangements that effectively leverage scarce human resources 
Under this last step, a number of actions were taken to simultaneously change tax 
policies, strengthen revenue administration, and strengthen expenditure management 
and control. In some cases, some of these actions were taken at the time that enabling 
laws were passed (see discussion above).  
Policies to mobilize revenues 
Mobilizing domestic revenues presented a difficult challenge in the postconflict era. The 
task was complicated in some countries where the tax base was limited in the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict, owing to the destruction and disruption of economic activity. 
The immediate objective of tax policy in postconflict countries was to raise revenue 
quickly to finance the most urgent government activities and address macroeconomic 
imbalances. The longer-term objective was to rehabilitate the tax system, so as to   14
mobilize revenues sufficient to cover a significant portion of public expenditures. In 
general, tax policy proposals were consistent with the objective of establishing a fair, 
transparent, and efficient tax system.12 However, the strategy for revenue generation 
had to take into account the state of existing institutions and capacity available to 
implement policies, as well as tax instruments in place at the time the conflict ended. In 
addition, there was often a trade-off between short-term revenue mobilization efforts 
and tax efficiency. In some instances, taxes that were less than desirable from an 
efficiency point of view were recommended, given the limited options available for 
generating revenues. 
 
A major challenge for some countries was that a large share of the tax base—in 
particular, incomes of those working for international institutions—was exempt from 
income taxation. Many postconflict countries did not impose national income tax on the 
incomes of expatriates entering the country in connection with relief and reconstruction 
work. The differential treatment of these expatriates risked the creation of a culture of 
tax exemptions, and made it more difficult to implement a simple tax system where all 
taxpayers faced a level playing field. 
 
In existing countries, the approach to revenue mobilization was dictated by the tax 
system already in place and the administrative and technical capacity available at the 
time. The approach was to rely as much as possible on the existing system to raise 
revenues in the short run, and delay major policy initiatives until sufficient capacity had 
been rebuilt. In some countries, major sources of revenues remained largely unaffected 
by the conflict or were quickly rehabilitated after the cessation of hostilities. In those 
countries, greater attention was paid in the early postconflict period on restoring 
capacity in revenue administration. Tax instruments were left largely intact, except for 
modifications to make them simpler, more transparent, and easier to implement. Some 
emphasis was also placed on the collection of arrears; for example, in one country a key 
IMF recommendation was to accelerate collection of tax arrears from public enterprises, 
as well as arrears on profit transfers to the budget. Where conflict had so severely 
damaged capacity that the existing system could not be implemented effectively, the 
approach was to simplify and streamline the system by reducing the number of taxes, 
harmonizing rates, and reducing exemptions. In some countries, capacity was so 
depleted after the conflict that only border taxes provided a significant source of 
revenue, even though the existing tax system in the country—on paper—was quite 
satisfactory. 
 
                                                 
12 The objective was to gradually establish a tax system that minimizes distortions and is generally 
perceived as being fair. To this end, the tax system should (i) minimize interference with individual 
consumption, saving, investment and production decisions; (ii) be relatively simple, transparent, and 
rules-based, which facilitates compliance, makes tax administration easier, and reduces corruption; and 
(iii) be stable and predictable, so that economic agents can avoid the harmful effects of uncertainty.   15
In most postconflict countries, revenue mobilization relied heavily on indirect taxes. In 
the initial stages, the emphasis was on international trade taxes (including sales taxes 
imposed on imports). These were relatively easy to monitor and collect, given that there 
were only a few border points through which international trade could be conducted. In 
view of the limited capacity available, the structure of customs tariffs was kept simple, 
and in some cases consisted of one single rate with limited exemptions. A sales and 
excise tax on imports was also introduced in some cases, again with a simplified 
structure. In the initial postconflict period, with limited domestic production, imports 
accounted for a very high proportion of consumption; as such, a sales tax on imports 
effectively constituted a domestic consumption tax. 
 
Exchange rate policy also had an impact on revenue collection in postconflict countries 
that were highly dependent on international trade. In at least one country immediate 
unification of the official and parallel market exchange rates had a large positive impact 
on budgetary revenues, since about 60 per cent of total government revenue was derived 
from a dollar-denominated tax base. 
 
Some countries also introduced a tax on major exports. In cases where one or two 
products constituted the bulk of the exports whose production was quickly restored 
following the end of the conflict (e.g., coffee and cashew nuts), an export tax was seen 
as another area for revenue mobilization in the early postconflict period. From an 
efficiency standpoint, these taxes leave much to be desired, as they divert resources 
away from their most productive uses. In addition, by retarding investment in export 
sectors, these taxes may contribute to future difficulties in the balance of payments. To 
avoid these distortions, an income tax—including on the incomes of exporters—could 
be imposed, instead of a tax on exports per se. In some postconflict countries, however, 
this was not a viable option for raising a large amount of revenue, given the complexity 
of administering this tax. In this light, a tax on exports was seen as a necessary evil, 
albeit one that would, over the longer term, be phased out as other sources of revenue 
became available. 
 
Taxes on selected services with easy tax handles such as restaurants, hotels, and car 
rentals were recommended. A broader tax on domestically produced goods was 
considered to be unrealistic in some countries, given the widespread destruction caused 
by the conflict and limited administrative capacity. At the same time, the large influx of 
expatriates led to a surge in spending at a small number of hotels and restaurants, 
providing an easily identifiable tax base that could be exploited in a simple and 
straightforward manner. The fact that the burden of these taxes would fall on these 
expatriates also made them politically attractive. In the initial stages, this tax was to be 
confined to a few large business organizations. As administrative capability developed, 
the coverage of the tax was intended to be broadened to cover areas such as 
professional, legal, and accounting services.  
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In a few countries, changes in administered prices also provided an important source of 
revenue. For example, domestic market prices of petroleum products were adjusted 
significantly in order to generate revenue, rationalize the consumption of energy, and 
discourage smuggling to neighboring countries. This was followed by the introduction 
of a comprehensive system for taxing energy from domestic sources. 
 
In most countries, some form of income taxation was also proposed. This was deemed 
necessary for two reasons. First, in some countries, the income tax, in some form or 
another, existed in the preconflict period. Thus, although the tax was complex to 
administer, there was previous experience to draw upon while revitalizing this source of 
revenue. Second, policymakers were concerned that if an income tax of some sort was 
not introduced from the outset, it would be politically difficult to do so later on. In all 
cases, the form of taxation proposed had to take into account the available 
administrative and technical capacity of the country, as well as the loss of some of the 
tax base owing to the adverse effects of conflict on economic activity and the stock of 
private sector capital. It was generally recommended that tax rates be harmonized and 
reduced to encourage compliance, and that the tax base be broadened by limiting 
exemptions.  
 
A particularly attractive form of income taxation in the early postconflict period was a 
flat withholding tax on wages. This had three advantages. First, the administration of the 
tax was relatively straightforward. Second, given the relatively small private sector, 
most of the taxpayers would be public servants or local employees of international 
organizations working on relief and reconstruction projects. In addition, in some cases it 
would be applied, initially, to relatively high income earners. Thus, the tax would not 
affect the large majority of the population, thereby reducing resistance to this measure. 
And, third, in some countries there was some sort of a tax on wages before the conflict 
began, and thus the reintroduction of the tax in the early stages of the postconflict period 
was deemed appropriate.  
 
Measures were also suggested for taxing business income. In the initial stages, a 
presumptive tax on income was recommended for small businesses. For example, tax 
assessments would be based on the type of product sold, square footage of the 
enterprise, or a rough estimate of turnover. While the expected revenue yield from such 
a tax was not projected to be significant, it was envisaged that in many countries small 
businesses would quickly become a visibly active part of the economy. As such, there 
was concern that exempting them from taxation would promote a culture of tax non-
compliance. A presumptive tax was considered appropriate at this stage, as small 
businesses were not expected to be able to maintain reliable accounts, and audit capacity 
in revenue administration was weak. For large unincorporated businesses, a similar tax 
was proposed. In one case a minimum business profits tax of between 1 and 2 per cent 
of the previous year’s turnover was proposed—a measure that could be implemented 
without the passing of a new law.   17
It was recommended that corporate income taxes be simplified. In some cases, a profit 
tax existed, but yielded paltry revenues on account of excessively generous tax 
incentives. In this case, it was suggested that tax incentives be replaced with a simple—
and less generous—tax credit for investment in fixed assets. In other cases the 
recommendation was to replace the progressive corporate tax with a flat income tax on 
all business income. It was also suggested that investment incentives be streamlined and 
made more transparent. 
Strengthening revenue administration 
In newly created countries, a new revenue administration (tax and customs) needed to 
be established. In existing countries, depending on the degree of disruption caused by 
the conflict, some revenue administration capacity was preserved, but it was less 
effective than before the conflict. Establishing and strengthening revenue administration 
in postconflict countries generally involved a two-stage process. In the first stage, the 
priority was to get the tax/customs administrations ‘up and running’. This meant starting 
revenue collection and registering/controlling the flow of goods across borders—within 
the twelve months immediately following the end of the conflict. In the second stage—
anywhere from twelve to eighteen months after the conflict—the emphasis was on 
helping countries design, and begin implementing, a medium- to long-term strategy for 
reforming revenue administration. Such strategies were designed to fit country-specific 
circumstances and based, as much as possible, on international best practices. 
Re-establishing basic tax administration infrastructure 
Once key legislation was put in place (see above), a critical priority was to secure the 
basic infrastructure (buildings, office equipment, and materials) for a functioning 
revenue administration. In newly created countries or territories, often the very basic 
requirements for a functioning national revenue administration, such as telephone lines, 
vehicles, and physically-sound buildings were needed before operations could even 
begin. In many countries, international financing was made available for this purpose. 
In all cases, the IMF worked closely with the authorities and donors to mobilize the 
resources and define their use. The need for a basic information system that permitted 
the authorities to produce revenue statistics and monitor key operations such as the 
number of registered taxpayers, tax returns filed, and payments made was identified. 
Given countries’ limited capacity, it was often recommended that the process of 
modernization begin with a few selected tax offices representing the bulk of government 
revenue. 
Identifying and appointing key staff 
A key step in getting the revenue administrations up and running was to identify and 
appoint key staff in senior positions. This was a challenging task in countries without a 
pre-existing or a seriously impaired national revenue administration following the 
conflict as there was no pool of experienced government officials to manage and staff 
the revenue administration. In some cases, at the request of the countries, the IMF’s   18
technical assistance included identifying a foreign expert who could serve as a ‘shadow’ 
commissioner. This senior official would take the lead in managing the fledgling 
revenue administration while working closely with national counterparts to train local 
staff. The objective was to transfer management responsibilities to local personnel in as 
short a time as possible. 
Registration and taxpayer identification 
In newly formed countries legislation was needed to require individuals or companies 
engaged in commercial activities to register with the authorities. In countries where a 
taxpayer register existed this was used as the starting point. In some cases, however, 
conflict resulted in important changes in the nature and structure of activities of these 
taxpayers, necessitating a rebuilding of the taxpayer register. Steps were also needed to 
ensure that all potential new taxpayers were registered. Therefore, registration-check 
audits were recommended, along with an appropriate penalty regime for non-registerers. 
 
It was also recommended that all registered taxpayers be assigned a unique taxpayer 
identification number (TIN). This number would be used by taxpayers for filing their 
taxes (e.g., VAT, corporate income tax). The TIN was expected to (i) effectively 
identify taxpayers on a nation-wide basis, (ii) assist the revenue administration in 
crosschecking information on taxpayer compliance, and (iii) at a later stage, facilitate 
computerization of tax administration. 
Establishing basic filing and payment procedures  
Establishing simple procedures for filing and payment of taxes or simplification of 
existing procedures was also identified. In many countries, simple return filing and 
payment procedures were set up that would be easy for taxpayers to comply with and 
place the least administrative burden on the fledgling revenue administrations. Tax 
return forms were simplified to enable taxpayers to calculate and report their tax 
liabilities accurately and easily. In some countries, the national language changed as a 
result of the conflict, and new forms were designed to take this into account. Countries 
were also advised to undertake public information campaigns to educate taxpayers on 
procedures for calculating their tax liabilities, completing their tax returns, and paying 
the taxes owed. Internal procedures for processing tax returns and payments, and 
reconciling payment information with that of the banks and the national treasury, were 
also defined. 
Creation of a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) 
An LTU, focusing on taxpayers accounting for a significant majority (usually 60–80 per 
cent) of the tax revenues, was recommended for many countries. In the initial phases of 
the postconflict period, enforcing compliance with basic tax regulations was a major 
challenge. Scarce administrative capacity could best be used, it was argued, by 
concentrating on the relatively small number of taxpayers accounting for the lion’s 
share of tax collections. In the latter phases of the postconflict period, focusing audit   19
activity on firms monitored by the LTU was seen as more effective in helping raise 
these taxpayer’s compliance (and thus revenue) than more generalized approaches 
applied to all taxpayers. Moreover, it was also envisaged that setting up LTUs would 
contribute to longer-term development of tax administration by providing a pilot—with 
respect to new organizational structure, systems, and procedures (taxpayer registration, 
filing and payment, audit, enforcement, and taxpayer services)—based on best practices. 
Setting up the LTUs in a postconflict environment, however, was not an easy task. First, 
they required a qualified pool of staff who could effectively audit the large taxpayers. 
This necessitated a higher degree of preparation and training than was often available in 
postconflict countries. Second, in postconflict countries, the disruption of economic 
activity during the conflict made it difficult to identify large taxpayers and to assess the 
impact of the new legislation affecting them. 
Re-establishing expenditure management and control 
Upon entering the postconflict era, most countries lacked a well functioning PEM 
system. The immediate objectives for improving budget management in postconflict 
environments included (i) restoring control over the expenditure aggregates (fiscal 
discipline), (ii) ensuring that the budget is spent according to government priorities 
(improving allocative efficiency), and (iii) giving donors fiduciary assurances that their 
money is spent in line with what they intend. The last point was particularly important, 
given that most postconflict countries received a substantial amount of foreign 
assistance for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes. Thus, accurate and meaningful 
information on government spending dictated that donor funds should flow through the 
government expenditure system. However, donors would only agree to this if 
transparent and accountable procedures for executing public spending were in place. 
These concerns underscored the need for urgent attention towards improving PEM 
systems in postconflict countries. 
 
Ensuring that the budget was executed—and not just that total expenditures were under 
control—was also a central challenge in the postconflict era. In some countries, budgets 
were not being executed, given the inexperience of the government. This implied that 
some critical programmes for reconstruction were not being implemented. 
 
Some aspects of the PEM system were accorded greater priority than others in the early 
postconflict period. Two areas received special attention during this phase: (i) ensuring 
that the central authority had control over all revenues and expenditures, and 
(ii)  establishing a simple accounting and reporting framework with an appropriate 
budget classification. In countries where a system was already in place, the approach 
was to strengthen existing systems. In other countries, the emphasis was on establishing 
rudimentary systems that were capable of timely and transparent formulation and   20
reporting of expenditure and revenues at a fairly aggregate level.13 In some cases, 
however, the nature of the conflict did not permit the centralization of all revenues and 
expenditures. In some cases, training was seen as an urgent need in the short run. While 
training was also envisaged over the long term (see below), in some countries a crash-
course of training in basic accounting, financial management, and computer operations 
was seen as critical for getting the PEM system up and running. 
 
In some countries, a significant portion of revenue and spending was not flowing 
through the treasury during the conflict period. Thus, government accounts presented 
only a partial picture of the fiscal situation. With a return to more normal conditions, an 
attempt was made to reduce fiscal operations conducted through extrabudgetary 
channels by integrating all government revenues and expenditures into the treasury.14 
Another complicating factor was that in the initial postconflict phase, a large part of 
both recurrent and capital expenditure was financed by donors. It was advised that all 
donor funds should flow through the government’s PEM system, and that donors avoid 
establishing competing or conflicting aid disbursement and management mechanisms. 
At the same time, it was recognized that donors would, in many cases, oppose this 
recommendation, given their intent to control the outlays they financed. 
 
Improved information on government financial flows was also seen as important for 
ensuring that all government revenues and spending were captured in a comprehensive 
fashion. In particular, comprehensive information on government accounts in the 
banking sector is needed to help ascertain the accuracy of data on fiscal outturns based 
on accounting data. To improve the quality of financing data and to simplify the process 
of collecting this information, it was advised that countries implement a Treasury Single 
Account (TSA). It was envisaged that all government revenues and expenditures would 
flow through the TSA. The TSA would also allow for better cash management by 
consolidating cash resources in a single account. In some countries, such an account 
already existed, but was not comprehensive. In such situations, the approach was to 
gradually integrate revenue and expenditure flows that were outside of the TSA. In 
some cases spending agencies held accounts in commercial banks and the approach was 
to gradually consolidate these accounts in the TSA.15 
 
The recommended route for establishing the second objective—a meaningful 
accounting framework—varied according to country circumstances. In some countries 
                                                 
13 In one country, for example, it was recommended that a rudimentary budgetary circular be prepared to 
provide key assumptions—e.g. on staffing—for spending departments to submit their budget requests. 
14 Lags in fiscal reporting were also a concern, including in the postconflict period. For example, in one 
country the treasury did not receive any cash transfers from about half of the provincial tax-collecting 
agencies for a period of over six months. 
15 In one country, for example, there were literally hundreds of different bank accounts.   21
the existing accounting structure was reasonably compatible with acceptable 
international standards, and thus the existing system could be used in the initial phases 
of the postconflict period. However, in others this was not the case, and in newly 
created countries sometimes no accounting structure existed. There was thus the need to 
introduce a simple classification system based on administrative units and core 
functions (e.g., health, education, and security), a few broad economic items (such as 
wages and salaries, goods and services, and capital expenditures), and a funds/projects 
classification to facilitate the tracking of funds from different donors. Such a 
classification provided for streamlining and simplifying budget documentation and 
thereby promoted fiscal transparency. In addition, a unified reporting format was also 
developed in these countries to facilitate timely and transparent reporting of fiscal 
operations, both to the government and donors. 
 
Following the establishment of a basic PEM system, additional steps were 
recommended to strengthen budget execution. Improved cash flow planning was seen as 
an essential component in improving budget management. A system to control spending 
at the commitment stage was also advocated; in cases where commitment control 
existed, a strengthening of the system was recommended. A basic computerized system 
to process checks, record information, and produce timely fiscal reports was also 
suggested in some countries; in others, however, computerization was only viewed as 
feasible for central offices, with branch offices continuing to use manual procedures.16 
 
Further improvements in expenditure procedures were also advocated, but for the latter 
phases of the reconstruction process. These involved the reinforcement of the 
administrative and technical capacities of the line ministries and the implementation of 
more advanced training programmes, usually with donor financing. Other priorities 
included the drafting of manuals on budget preparation and expenditure authorization 
procedures. Over time, it was envisaged that a clear set of procedures for the monitoring 
and control of spending would also be developed and disseminated to all relevant 
government agencies. 
 
A strengthening of macro-fiscal analysis and audit capacity was also recommended. 
Setting up a macro-fiscal analysis unit was recommended to provide advice on general 
fiscal policy issues and the preparation of the budget. More specifically, it would assist 
the ministry of finance in preparing revenue forecasts for the budget year and fiscal 
policy scenarios. The timeframe for the establishment of this unit varied depending on 
country-specific circumstances. At the same time, gradual development and 
strengthening of auditing capacity, together with the establishment of a code of fiscal 
                                                 
16 In most countries, full computerization of the treasury ledger and payments system was viewed as a 
medium-term (rather than short-term) objective.    22
conduct, were recommended for limiting corruption, waste, and misappropriation of 
public resources. 
5  Summary and conclusions 
It is widely recognized that economic recovery is an essential ingredient for building 
and sustaining peace in postconflict countries. Macroeconomic conditions in these 
countries were adverse before conflict began and deteriorated further as a result of it. 
Real incomes fell during the conflict, fiscal deficits widened, and inflation skyrocketed. 
Moreover, the composition of spending also worsened due to the conflict. Addressing 
these macroeconomic imbalances was important for jump-starting the economy and 
laying the basis for sustained growth. 
 
Economic recovery required supporting institutions and policies, many of which were 
lacking in postconflict countries. In many countries, institutions were either non-existent 
when the conflict ended, or were severely damaged by the conflict. Capacity for policy 
formulation was also often weak. Therefore, establishing and strengthening key 
institutions was an important early step in many of these countries. 
 
Building fiscal institutions in postconflict countries essentially entails a three-step 
process. These are: creating a legal framework for fiscal management; establishing and 
strengthening the fiscal authority; and designing appropriate policies while 
simultaneously strengthening revenue administration and public expenditure 
management. The sequencing of the steps has differed across countries, depending on 
country-specific circumstances. The ultimate aim, however, has always been the 
same—to make fiscal policy and fiscal management effective and transparent. 
 
Four objectives have guided institution building in the fiscal area: These are (i) avoiding 
ad hoc decision making; (ii) promoting transparency in fiscal operations; (iii) ensuring a 
minimum level of revenue collection; and, (iv) ensuring that spending patterns reflected 
established priorities. A first step was usually to review existing legislation, with a view 
to simplifying tax laws and administrative procedures or to establish new ones if 
existing laws and procedures were viewed as inadequate. The next step was to 
strengthen the central fiscal authority or set one up if none existed. Such an authority 
usually consisted of four departments: a budget department, a treasury department, and 
separate departments for tax and customs administration. In some countries, an explicit 
mechanism for co-ordinating donor assistance was also established. 
 
The IMF’s advice was in many ways similar to what it recommends in countries without 
conflicts, but with important nuances to reflect the realities of postconflict countries. For 
example, recommendations to introduce simple income taxes based on withholding of 
wages, to create Large Taxpayer Units, and improve budget classification are frequently 
recommended in the IMF’s advice for developing countries. At the same time, this   23
advice was tailored to the circumstances of postconflict countries. For example, with 
respect to tax policy, there was generally more openness to policies that were not first-
best from an efficiency point of view (e.g., export taxes), given the urgent need to 
generate revenue. In a similar vein, proposals to improve tax administration focused on 
very rudimentary aspects of these procedures (e.g., procedures for filing and payment of 
taxes and registration checks). Similarly, on the expenditure side, the focus was to 
implement very simple systems (e.g., budget classifications under very broad categories 
of outlays) to be improved at a later stage. In some cases, the adoption of the first 
postconflict budget—sometimes a transitional one—became an urgent priority, unlike in 
the case of most other countries receiving IMF advice. 
 
The sequencing of reforms was also different for postconflict countries. The timetable 
for implementing reforms that are part and parcel of a good system of fiscal 
management—for example, an adequate medium-term expenditure framework—was 
also much longer. In general, recommendations had to focus on a large number of 
intermediate measures over the short term that could gradually move budgetary 
practices from a crisis mode (e.g., where budgets were implemented on a three-month 
basis) to a more normal state of affairs.  
 
In framing these short-term policies and arrangements, care was taken to ensure that 
they did not pose an insurmountable obstacle for the eventual transformation to a 
modern fiscal management system. Looking forward, additional research is needed to 
ascertain the track record of countries in implementing these recommendations and 
what progress has been made toward more permanent improvements in the operations 
of fiscal institutions. 
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